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Executive Summary 
 
 Information security is relatively new field that is experiencing rapid growth in 
terms of malicious attack frequency and the amount of capital that firms must spend on 
attack defense.  This rise in security expenditures has prompted corporate leadership 
teams to scrutinize corporate security budgets.  Information security risk, and the related 
financial impact, is not as easily calculated as other traditional sources of enterprise risk.  
 This research provides one method by which a firm may calculate the likelihood 
of a successful cyber security attack and the resulting financial impacts.  The method 
incorporates annual loss expectancy and cost-benefit, which are tools familiar to most 
mid-level managers responsible for budget creation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The practice of securing information is likely as old as humankind.  Cyber 
information security, however, is a relatively young field that has risen in importance as 
businesses increasingly rely on information technology (IT) systems for operations.   
Many midsize and large corporations employ people, technology, and processes to 
protect their information assets.  For these firms, some of the most difficult questions to 
answer are: 
 
• “What security metrics should be captured?” 
• “What attacks are my systems vulnerable to?” 
• “What is the likelihood that the company will experience a data breach?” 
• “How much are the IT assets in the corporation worth?” 
• “How much should the corporation spend to protect its IT assets?” 
 
All of these questions can begin to be answered by utilizing risk assessment and risk 
management techniques.  This research provides a method for calculating a corporation’s 
financial exposure to cyber information security breaches using components of the 
common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) in conjunction with asset values, annual 
loss expectancy (ALE), and cost to remediate. 
Research regarding information security expenditures has largely focused on concepts 
such as return on investment (ROI), return on security investment (ROSI), and cost-
benefit analysis, as well as, ALE and various forms of threat modeling.  In the author’s 
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own industry experience, corporations are actually significantly less sophisticated in their 
information security budgeting practices.  The author contends that most information 
security expenditures are made with little quantitative data and are commonly based on 
the intuition of internal experts or the marketing influence of those who sell security 
products.  What has been missing is a simple approach that mid-level managers, who are 
not information security experts, can use to understand the risk introduced in their 
corporation via security vulnerabilities.  The approach should be simple in concept, use 
readily available tools, and reduce the uncertainty of risk to a level that is “just good 
enough”. 
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2. Literature Review 
The literature review for this research explores some of the common business 
drivers, or market forces, that create the need for information security.  Common cyber 
security vulnerabilities and threats are also defined. After establishing the need for 
information security, conventional financial methods for the justification of security 
spend are analyzed.  This research argues arriving at the frequency at which security 
vulnerabilities will be exploited is the most significant barrier to producing accurate 
estimates of loss expectancy, and this problem may be solved through a novel use of the 
CVSS. 
2.1 Business Value of Information Systems and Data 
 
 Information systems comprise much of the internal infrastructure that supports 
modern businesses.  Quite simply, the effective use of IT systems results in more efficient 
business processes which ultimately lower costs and increase profits.  It follows that the 
physical machines and software that runs upon them have a value to the business that is 
greater than that retail price paid.   
A 2006 study reports that 80% of firms maintain business continuity programs 
(Gale 1).  Business continuity programs  that include IT infrastructure are easily justified, 
as finance departments have access to historical data that assists them in calculating the 
likelihood that an earthquake, wildfire, tornado, or hurricane might occur.  In addition, 
the mean time between failures for IT systems is often published and predicts with some 
accuracy the likelihood of machine failure.  These data sets, in turn, help businesses plan 
their business continuity spending.   
  9 
 Data that is stored, processed, or transmitted by information systems also has 
value.  In fact, businesses can mine data stored in IT systems and turn it into knowledge 
used to make business decisions.  That is, data queries may be structured in such a way 
they can be used to answer questions, like “Where is the bottle neck in our distribution 
channel?” and “Why do our customers buy more widgets in the North Central Region on 
Monday mornings than on Tuesdays?”  This data, especially when it contains privacy 
data, financial information, or trade secrets, is also valuable to malicious individuals and 
organized crime.  Typically, a firm will want to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of all critical systems and information. 
2.2 Business Drivers:  Standards and Regulations 
The need to provide funding for resources to secure information increases as the 
value of the information increases to the business, or as industry and government create 
standards and regulations that mandate controls.  These drivers create the requirement for 
security.  In the case of industry and government mandates, where a business has little or 
no other option, funding for security expenditures is easily justified.  The payment card 
industry data security standard (PCI-DSS) is one such industry initiative.  A consortium 
formed by the credit card brands, the PCI-DSS is a prescriptive standard that dictates how 
merchants must handle card holder data.  Some states have begun to codify this standard 
into law.  As of January 1, 2010, all merchants in the state of Nevada must be compliant 
with the PCI-DSS standards (Wiener).  Other examples of government regulation include 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (Congress) and 
California’s privacy law SB1386 (Peace).  However, when the only driver for 
information security expenditures is the value of the information to the corporation, 
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justification of the investment is usually required via a strong business case.  
Unfortunately, business cases for information security expenditures are not easily 
produced. 
2.3 Business Drivers:  Black Market Value 
Aside from industry standards and regulations, the intrinsic value of data on the 
black market also creates a business driver to secure data and systems.  The Verizon 
Business RISK team, formerly Cybertrust, produces a comprehensive annual data breach 
report using data collected from 150 forensic engagements involving the compromise of 
over 285 million records (Baker 8).  It makes a strong case for the need to secure 
information security assets because it shows stolen data has real value on the black 
market, thus making IT systems a target worthy of attack.  The report published in 2009 
estimates credit card magnetic stripe data was worth about $0.50 a record in 2008 (Baker 
8).  This figure is down from approximately $10-$16 USD per record in 2007, but 
illustrates beautifully how the supply and demand of the black market is alive and 
functioning to drive illicit activities, just as it does in legitimate markets (Baker 8).  
2.4 Security Vulnerabilities 
 Security vulnerabilities can result from various conditions.  Breaches to physical 
security, such as when an unattended laptop is stolen, are one example.  For the purposes 
of this research, physical security vulnerabilities are beyond scope.  The three primary 
conditions that lead to a cyber security vulnerabilities referenced in this research are 
denial of service conditions, incorrectly configured system parameters, and a broad array 
of code related defects. 
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2.4.1 Denial of Service 
 A denial of service (DoS) condition is one that affects the availability of a system.  
A DoS is typically accomplished by causing an application fault by providing some input 
that the program was not expecting, and thus, does not understand how to process.  More 
recently, large armies of personal computers are compromised to form a “botnet” 
(Lejeune 1).  Once a malicious person has gathered enough “bots”, he or she may instruct 
them to flood a target system with network traffic causing the target to be too busy to 
handle requests from legitimate users (Lejeune 1).  This technique is known as a 
distributed denial of service (DDoS).  The threat of DDoS is typically used by criminals 
to extort money, and is a vulnerability type that is not covered in this work. 
2.4.2 System Mis-configuration 
 As defined by Sergy Chernov, “Change control is a process of submitting, 
authorizing, implementing, and reviewing changes to the company’s computing 
environment  software/hardware/networking) to minimize downtime and to keep all IT 
teams informed regarding  proposed changes” (Chernov 9).  For companies that lack 
mature IT change control and IT audit programs, improper system configuration is a risk 
for unwittingly introducing security vulnerabilities.  Examples of system mis-
configuration might include blank or default passwords, or incorrect file system 
permissions.  These mistakes make system breaches all too easy for the attacker. 
2.4.3 Code Defects 
Code defects are another very broad, but common problem.  Companies not in the 
business of making software and hardware typically rely on commercial off the shelf 
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(COTS) products written by established firms.  Unfortunately, some of the largest 
software companies release products with security vulnerabilities to the market.  
Microsoft , for example, has implemented a security software development lifecycle 
process (Microsoft 1).  In light of the effort to produce more secure software, Microsoft 
still “released a total of 74 bulletins in 2009 to address 189 vulnerabilities” (Prince 1).   
For the purposes of the research, code defects will be defined as any coding error that 
results in a security vulnerability.  In reality, there exists an entire taxonomy for 
categorizing code defects that lead to a security vulnerability, but that minutiae does not 
need to be explored in this research.   
2.5 Cyber Security Threats 
 Cyber security threats can broadly be categorized as originating from three 
sources:  internal, external, and partners (Baker 9).  Internal threat agents are those 
human resources that are employed at a firm.  Internal threat agents typically have some 
level of elevated access, and in fact, accounted for 20% of the breaches in 2008 (Baker 
9).  Partners can be described as those firms with which a company engages in a business 
relationship (Baker 9).  Partners oftentimes logically represent an extension of a 
corporation’s network and bring with them a level of trust (Baker 9).  Firms must 
contractually enforce that partners follow security practices that are as good as or better 
than those of a firm.  Partners were implicated in 32% of the data breaches in 2008 
(Baker 9).  External threats are those originating from outside of a firm.  There is no 
implied trust with the parties that comprise the threat agents in this group (Baker 9).  
Many are linked to organized crime, government entities, and hacking groups and were 
responsible for most of the documented breaches (74%) in 2008 (Baker  9).  Note these 
  13 
percentages sum to more than 100%, as breaches often involve actors from more than a 
single group (Baker 9). 
2.6 Financial Calculations  
Prior to making any capital or operational expenditures, firms will seek to realize 
a positive financial outcome.  In the case of information security spending, this concept 
may be thought of as a reduction in loss.  Common financial calculations used by firms in 
decision making include ROI, ROSI, and cost-benefit. 
2.6.1 Return on Investment  
 One classic method for determining whether or not a business should provide 
resources to a project is ROI.  The traditional simple calculation for ROI over one period 
of time is (Brotby 27): 
 
ROI = (Net Income) / (Net Investment) 
 
If a practitioner rearranges this equation to include net savings, it can begin to become 
useful to security managers (Brotby 27): 
 
ROI = (Net Savings) / (Net Investment) 
 
The ROI method of calculating the value of a security investment is simple; however, it 
assumes that one can accurately calculate what net savings are.  That is, it does not factor 
in the concept of risk which makes this calculation of little value (Brotby 30).  In 
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addition, it ignores the time value of money, assumes that the investment itself and its 
benefits will last for the depreciable life of the asset, and does not give weight to the 
timing of cash flows (Brotby 29).  Other more robust methods of ROI calculation, such as 
net present value (NPV) and internal rate of return solve some of these issues. 
2.6.2 Return on Security Investment 
 Another method of calculating the value of security investments is ROSI.  ROSI 
is similar to ROI, but includes the concepts of risk exposure and risk mitigation.  ROSI is 
calculated as (Sonnenreich, Albanese et al. 46): 
 
ROSI = [(Risk Exposure) (Percent Risk Mitigated) – (Solution Cost)]/ (Solution 
Cost) 
 
One problem with ROSI is risk exposure is a value is typically estimated by experts and 
is highly subjective when calculated by internal resources. 
2.6.3 Cost-benefit 
 Cost-benefit analysis has also been proposed as a method for calculating security 
spend.  Lawrence Gordon and Martin Loeb have written extensively about using cost-
benefit analysis for security budgets.  They suggest “firms should invest up to the point 
where the last dollar of information security investment yields a dollar of savings” 
(Gordon and Loeb 121).  One method they propose employs NPV that provides a “risk-
adjusted discount present value of expected benefits with expected costs” (Gordon and 
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Loeb 122).  As is the case with ROSI, cost-benefit requires the opinion a security 
practitioner to estimate the probability and magnitude of losses.   
2.7 Frequency 
 The most difficult task in calculating security spending is determining the 
likelihood a security vulnerability will actually be exploited.  If one looks to the 
insurance industry for guidance, we see that there exists a field called actuary science 
whose purpose is to calculate financial risk when there is some level of uncertainty.  
Fortunately for actuaries, in many areas, there exists an extensive history of data upon 
which to rely.  For example, an actuary can produce an accurate insurance premium for a 
45 year old male smoker with high cholesterol, diabetes, and a family history of heart 
disease.  The cache of historical data available to actuaries allows for the frequency of 
uncertain events, and thus financial risk, to be easily calculated.  Unfortunately, for the 
information security industry, the historical data needed for these types of calculations 
does not exist.  To compound the problem, technology moves at a very rapid pace.  Thus, 
the threats, vulnerabilities, and exploits of today might be meaningless tomorrow.   
2.7.1 Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
As noted, one of the most difficult security values to calculate is the likelihood a 
vulnerability will actually be exploited.  In many organizations, likelihood or frequency is 
estimated by an internal expert.  The problem with this approach is individuals tend to 
produce varying opinions and could over-estimate or under-estimate likelihood.  
Additionally, it is very difficult for a single practitioner to be well versed in all 
technologies of a system.  Web developers, database administrators, network engineers, 
  16 
and operating system administrators spend entire careers honing their craft.  The depth of 
knowledge required to analyze a particular vulnerability outside one’s discipline, and its 
likelihood of being exploited, is very difficult for a single person to do.  Furthermore, the 
cost of hiring a person or team of persons, with the knowledge to accurately achieve this 
is beyond what many firms can afford.  A more reliable and easier method for calculating 
frequency can be derived from the CVSS. 
 The CVSS is a vendor-neutral vulnerability scoring system, and is maintained by 
the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST).  CVSS scores are 
composed from three metric groups - Base, Temporal, and Environmental (Mell, 
Scarfone et al. 3).  Each of these global metric groups contains a set of internal metrics as 
seen in Figure 1 (Mell, Scarfone et al. 5).  When used as intended by the authors of the 
CVSS, the metrics produce a score that helps practitioners determine the risk for a 
vulnerability (Mell, Scarfone et al. 4).  Scores generated on a scale of 0.0-10.0, are useful 
for the prioritization of mitigation strategies (Mell, Scarfone et al. 1).  These scores do 
not, however, predict the likelihood or frequency that an exploit will occur. 
Base Metrics 
Group
Temporal 
Metrics 
Group
Environmental 
Metrics Group
Authentication
Access Vector Confidentiality Impact
Access 
Complexity Integrity Impact
Availability 
Impact
Exploitability
Remediation 
Level
Report 
Confidence
Collateral 
Damage 
Potential
Confidentiality 
Requirement
Target 
Distribution
Integrity 
Requirement
Availability 
Requirement
 
Figure 1: CVSS Metrics Groups (Mell, Scarfone et al. 5) 
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2.7.1.1 Base Metrics Group 
The Base metric group seeks to represent the qualities of a particular vulnerability 
that are consistent across user environments (Mell, Scarfone et al. 6).  It is further 
decomposed as having the following metrics (Mell, Scarfone et al. 7-9): 
 
Access Vector (B_AV) – Describes the location from which a vulnerability can be 
exploited. 
Access Complexity (B_AC) – Describes the complexity of the attack once an 
attacker has gained access to the system  
Authentication (B_Au) – Describes how many times an attacker must authenticate 
to exploit a system. 
Confidentiality Impact (B_C) – Metric to describe if exploitation leads to 
unauthorized access to data. 
Integrity Impact (B_I) – Metric to describe if an attacker has the ability to modify 
data stored on system in such a manner that its integrity has been diminished and 
the data can no longer be trusted as genuine. 
Availability Impact (B_A) – Metric to describe if successful exploitation leads to 
degraded system performance, or even complete shutdown. 
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2.7.1.2 Temporal Metrics Group 
The Temporal metric group represents qualities of a vulnerability that are subject 
to change over time (Mell, Scarfone et al. 10).  The sub-components of the Temporal 
metrics group include (Mell, Scarfone et al. 10-11): 
 
Exploitability (T_E) – Describes whether or not the tools exist to exploit a 
vulnerability.  Often, exploitation is theoretical. 
Remediation Level (T_RL) – Metric to describe the currently available mitigation 
options.   
Report Confidence (T_RC) – Metric to describe the degree of confidence in the 
reported vulnerability.  Often, vulnerabilities are announced sans technical details.   
2.7.1.3 Environmental Metrics Group 
 The Environmental metrics group captures data specific to a firm’s infrastructure 
(Mell, Scarfone et al. 11).  Since this data will not be used directly in this research, it will 
not be described in detail.  More information can be found in the FIRST publication “A 
Complete Guide to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System Version 2.0” (Mell, 
Scarfone et al.). 
2.7.2 Obtaining Frequency from CVSS 
 Researchers Houmb and Franqueria describe a method for using CVSS sub-
components to calculate both frequency and impact in their research “Estimating ToE 
Risk Level using CVSS” (Houmb and Franqueira).  This method is further described in 
“Quantifying Security Risk Level from CVSS Estimates of Frequency and Impact” 
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(Houmb, Franqueira et al.).  In their method, both frequency and impact are utilized to 
generate risk level through the use of a Bayesian belief network (BBN) (Houmb, 
Franqueira et al. 7).  A BBN is a tool that can be used to model relationships between 
uncertain events that have influence upon one another.  The researchers complete model 
is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
B_ACB_AV
B_Au
T_RL T_E T_RC
Init 
Frequency
Frequency
Update 
Factor
E_CR E_IR E_AR
B_C B_I B_A
Impact
E_CDP
Risk Level
Risk Level 
UtilityUsed for Frequency 
Calculation
 
Figure 2:  Houmb BBN (Houmb, Franqueira et al. 6) 
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Houmb, et al.  use the sub-components of the CVSS as input to their BBN to arrive at 
calculations for frequency, impact, and risk level (Houmb, Franqueira et al. 7).  This 
approach is elegant for three reasons: 
1. The data is presumed to be accurate.  Most vulnerability CVSS sub-scores are 
authored by the makers of the technology product in question or professional 
vulnerability bulletin analysts (Mell, Scarfone et al. 5).  This point is important 
because scores are created by experts most familiar with the technology in 
question, and thus, their ratings are presumed to be properly calibrated.   
 
2. Almost all known vulnerabilities are catalogued by the National Vulnerability 
Database published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and 
sponsored by the United States Department of Homeland Security’s National 
Cyber Security Division (NIST 1).  The result is that most known vulnerabilities 
and their CVSS scores are readily available.  
 
3. Most commercial and open-source vulnerability scanners include CVSS scores as 
a reporting feature. 
 
 The idea behind the structure of the components of frequency calculation in the 
BBN is that the easier a vulnerability is to exploit, the more likely it is that it will be 
exploited (Houmb, Franqueira et al. 7).  This idea assumes hackers will target more 
vulnerable systems before expending the extra effort to exploit more difficult or 
unreliable vulnerabilities.  For input, the following attributes from the Base metrics group 
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are used:  Access Vector (B_AV), Access complexity (B_AC), and Authentication 
(B_Au) (Houmb, Franqueira et al. 6).  These elements are used to derive the misuse 
initial frequency (MFinit) (Houmb, Franqueira et al. 6).  Three attributes from the 
Temporal group are also included (Houmb, Franqueira et al. 6).  They are Remediation 
Level (T_RL), Exploitability (T_R), and Report Confidence (T_RC) (Houmb, Franqueira 
et al. 6).  These elements are used to derive the misuse update factor (MFuFac).  
Ultimately, both MFinit and MFuFac are combined to produce a final value representing 
misuse frequency (MF) as seen in Figure 3 (Houmb, Franqueira et al. 6).  The portion of 
the BBN responsible for calculating the impact of a vulnerability will not be used in the 
method described in this research. 
 There are three equations used to calculate MF in this model.  The first makes use 
of the Base metrics variables to calculate the MFinit, a second uses Temporal attributes to 
generate MFuFac, and final calculation produces MF (Houmb and Franqueira 721). 
( )∫=
1_
_,_,_
N
init AuBACBAVBPMF  
( )∫=
1_
_,_,_
N
uFac RCTRLTETPMF     
( )∫ ×=
1_N
uFacinit MFMFMF        
Values for these equations are sourced from the numerical weights assigned from the 
CVSS sub-scores as depicted in Table 1 (Houmb and Franqueira 721). 
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Table 1: CVSS Metrics Values (Houmb and Franqueira 721) 
CVSS Metrics 
Group 
CVSS Attribute Rating Rating Value 
Access Vector (B_AV) 
Local (L) 
Adjacent Network (A) 
Network N) 
0.395 
0.646 
1.0 
Attack Complexity 
(B_AC) 
High (H) 
Medium (M) 
Low (L) 
0.35 
0.61 
0.71 
Base Metrics 
Authentication 
Instances 
(B_Au) 
Multiple (M) 
Single (S) 
None (N) 
0.45 
0.56 
0.704 
Exploitability Tools & 
Techniques  
(T_E) 
Unproven (U) 
Proof-of-Concept 
Functional (F) 
High (H) 
0.85 
0.9 
0.95 
1.0 
Remediation Level 
(T_RL) 
Official Fix (OF) 
Temporary Fix (TF) 
Workaround (W) 
Unavailable (U) 
0.87 
0.90 
0.95 
1.0 
Temporal 
Metrics 
Report Confidence 
(T_RC) 
Unconfirmed (UC) 
Uncorroborated (UR) 
Confirmed (C) 
0.90 
0.95 
1.0 
 
2.7.3 Other Methods of Frequency Calculation 
The calculation of frequency in relation to the exploitation of security 
vulnerabilities has garnered the attention of many consultants and academics.  Two of the 
areas explored by other researchers for frequency calculation include game theory and 
Monte Carlo simulations. 
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2.7.3.1 Game Theory 
 Other methods of determining risk where uncertainty exists have been proposed 
by researchers.  Game theory is one such method.  Game theory attempts to model the 
actions of two competitive actors.  In the case of Information Security, these might be 
described as the “firm” and the “malicious threat agent”.  In the publication, “Risk 
Assessment of Malicious Attacks Against Power Systems”, researchers have created a 
model using game theory which produces a value for risk (Bompard, Ciwei et al. 1).  
Game theory models of this type require a strong understanding of graduate level 
mathematics.  It is the belief of the author that this model, due to complexity, would not 
be practical to implement by the average mid-level manager responsible for creating an 
information security budget.  
2.7.3.2 Monte Carlo Simulation 
 Monte Carlo simulation is another method by which it is possible to produce a 
value for risk in the presence of uncertainty.  One simplistic approach used to calculate 
frequency via Monte Carlo simulation is demonstrated in research authored by James 
Conrad (Conrad 1).   Conrad notes that, “A Monte-Carlo simulation enables an analyst to 
quantify the uncertainty in an expert’s estimate by defining it as a probability distribution 
rather than just a single expected value.” (Conrad  1).  While Conrad’s approach is valid, 
it does rely on experts to provide estimates as input to the model.  Thus, a firm would be 
required to employ analysts with a level of security knowledge commensurate with 
desired accuracy of estimations.      
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2.8 Summary 
Data stored in IT systems has both value to the businesses that rely upon it, as 
well as to black market actors.  The intrinsic value of this data in conjunction with 
mandatory government controls and contractual obligations create the requirement to 
secure it.  Given that security vulnerabilities are routinely discovered in IT systems, it 
follows that businesses must evaluate the financial costs associated with mitigating them.  
Paramount to the success of creating an accurate business case for these expenditures is 
the estimation of frequency that a successful exploitation will occur.  By utilizing 
publicly available CVSS data, mid-level managers can estimate frequency and 
successfully show the business benefit of security vulnerability mitigation. 
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3. Research Procedure 
 This report illustrates how mid-level managers can use simple tools to calculate 
cost avoidance through security spend.  The components for this calculation include 
system inventory, value of systems to the business, vulnerability scan data, and simple 
ALE and cost-benefit calculations.  The high-level steps involved in this research 
procedure are: 
• Definition of scope, to include system inventory 
• Execution of a security vulnerability assessment  
• Calculation of exploitation frequency based on CVSS 
• Definition of potential sources of financial impact 
• Calculation of ALE, SLE, and cost-benefit 
3.1 Scope Definition 
 The first step followed in this research procedure was to properly scope the 
systems under review.  All systems under review were inventoried and logically grouped 
into one or more “system codes”.   The “System code” concept was utilized to show 
relationships between devices or components across a distributed architecture.  
3.2 Vulnerability Assessment 
Following the collection of inventory, a vulnerability assessment was performed.  
A security vulnerability assessment is the process of looking for flaws in a system that 
would allow a malicious user to obtain access to data or cause the system to move to a 
non-functioning state.   
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3.3 Determine Frequency 
The next step presented in this research involves calculating the frequency of 
vulnerability exploitation.  The method of determining this frequency value makes use of 
a CVSS values extracted from vulnerability scan data. 
3.4 Determine Sources of Financial Impact 
After a vulnerability assessment was performed, the financial impact of downtime 
for the systems under review was determined.  Financial impact data was collected from 
internal experts with knowledge of the various sources that could result in financial 
losses. 
3.5 Calculate Financial Impact  
Lastly, there are three basic calculations utilized in this research to arrive at the 
figures to support financial decisions.  The financial calculations performed were SLE, 
ALE, and cost-benefit.  
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4. Results 
The research procedure outlined in this work was executed on production IT 
infrastructure and all mathematical calculations were modeled within a spreadsheet 
program.   
4.1 Scope Definition / Inventory 
Determining system scope is best illustrated with an example.  Consider a typical 
eCommerce web site, which is likely to include all of the following: 
- Multiple servers, running one or more operating systems (may be virtual) 
- COTS web software (for presentation and business logic) 
- COTS database 
- Network infrastructure, to include: routers, switches, load balancers, firewalls 
- Custom applications that are written in-house 
A diagram of a typical eCommerce environment is illustrated in Figure 3.  Each of the 
sub-components of the system may be subject to one or more security vulnerabilities, and 
successful exploitation of any could cause downtime for the entire site. 
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Figure 3:  Typical eCommerce Infrastructure 
 
In this research, a network vulnerability scan was performed on components 
typical of an eCommerce infrastructure using a commercially available security scanner.  
The architecture under review consisted of a web-based application with presentation, 
business logic, and database layers.  In addition, the architecture included a networking 
infrastructure to support packet flow and provide security.   
Each system in the architecture was categorized as belonging to a group, or 
“system code”.  This grouping is beneficial for showing the physical system relationships 
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in applications that have a distributed architecture.  In this example, there is a single 
application (ECOM) supported by two infrastructure “system codes” (NET & SEC).  In a 
true production environment, there would very likely be multiple applications supported 
by the NET and SEC “system codes”.  It follows that successful attacks on systems on 
infrastructure (NET and SEC) could affect all applications that rely upon them.  
However, the existence vulnerabilities on a second application (say ECOM2) may or may 
not result in collateral damage to ECOM.  It is the responsibility of the business to 
understand the intricacies of these “system code” relationships.  Table 2 shows the 
relationship between “system code” and physical device and Figure 4 depicts the entire 
environment. 
 
Table 2:  System Codes and Hostnames 
System Code Hostname IP Address 
NET Router _A 10.0.0.1 
NET Switch_A 192.168.5.11 
NET Switch_B 192.168.5.12 
NET Switch_C 192.168.5.13 
ECOM Web_Server_A 10.0.1.3 
ECOM App_Server_B 192.168.3.10 
ECOM Database_A 192.168.5.10 
SEC Firewall_A 10.0.1.2 
SEC Firewall_B 192.168.2.1 
SEC Firewall_C 192.168.4.1 
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Figure 4:  Test Environment 
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4.2 Vulnerability Assessment 
There are many techniques used in a vulnerability assessment exercise, ranging 
from interviews with system owners to the use of automated tools, however, vulnerability 
testing methodology typically falls into one of two categories.  “Black box” testing is a 
methodology where a tester has no knowledge of the system prior to the engagement.  
Conversely, in “white box” testing a tester will have full knowledge and access to all 
system components.  The “white box” testing methodology usually includes access to 
source code, as well.  In practice, most firms use a modified “black box” approach.  For 
example, a practitioner will have some knowledge of the environment they are testing 
(data flow, architectural diagrams, test user accounts, etc).  For the vulnerability 
assessment performed in this research, the complete network design was known. 
 There are many free and open-source tools available on the market that are 
reasonably accurate at identifying known security vulnerabilities.  Network vulnerability 
scanners are applications that work by first “fingerprinting” devices, a method of 
remotely identifying device type, followed by the execution of platform specific rules 
that probe a device for the existence of documented vulnerabilities.  The vulnerability 
scan data in this research was collected with a commercial product.   
For this exercise, the nCircle IP360 network vulnerability scanner was chosen.  
This commercial product was selected for its ability to provide all necessary vulnerability 
data and CVSS values in a text-based and tokenized comma separated values (CSV) 
format.  The CSV format is beneficial for this research due to the ease in which standard 
UNIX text manipulation tools can be used (‘sed’, ‘grep’, and ‘awk’).  The commercial 
version of the Nessus security scanner was also considered, but lacked a simple method 
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for extracting CVSS scores.  A raw version of the nCircle IP360 vulnerability output, 
with some extraneous fields removed, can be seen in Figure 5.  
 
DNS Name,IP Address,Vulnerability Name,Vulnerability Advisories  
Router_A,10.0.0.1,Telnet Available,nCircle CVSS Base Vector: 
(AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:N) 
Figure 5:  Raw Vulnerability Data 
  
The results of the network based vulnerability scan unveiled 405 vulnerabilities in 
the test environment.  The raw report files were parsed with UNIX utilities to output a 
format suitable for working within a spreadsheet program.  Microsoft Office Excel 2002 
was used for this example, but other spreadsheet programs should perform equally well.  
The data used to populate a tab titled “Inventory_Vuln” is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
System Code Hostname IP Address Vulnerability Name
Access Vector 
(B_AV)
Attack 
Complexity 
(B_AC)
Authentication 
Instances 
(B_Au)
Exploitability 
Tools & 
Techniques 
(T_E)
Remediation 
Level (T_RL)
Report 
Confidence 
(T_RC)
Confidentiality
(B_C)
NET Router_A 10.0.0.1 Cisco IOS and Cisco Unified Communications Manager  Voice VulnerabilitiesN M N F OF C P
NET Router_A 10.0.0.1 Cisco IOS and Cisco Unified Communications Manager Voice Vulnerabilities (II)N M N F OF C P
NET Router_A 10.0.0.1 Cisco IOS BGP Transitive Attribute Denial of Service VulnerabilityN L N U OF C N
NET Router_A 10.0.0.1 Cisco IOS Border Gateway Protocol Denial Of Service VulnerabilityN M N F OF C N
NET Router_A 10.0.0.1 Cisco IOS Border Gateway Protocol Processing Remote Denial Of Service VulnerabilityN L N U OF C N
NET Router_A 10.0.0.1 Cisco IOS Crafted IP Option Remote Code ExecutionN L N U OF C C
CVSS Base Metric Scores CVSS Temporal Metrics Score
 
Figure 6:  Vulnerability Inventory 
 
4.3 Frequency Calculations Based on CVSS Score 
The method for calculating the ARO is inspired by the work in “Estimating ToE 
Risk Level Using CVSS” (Houmb and Franqueira 7).   The ARO, a percentage, is 
calculated by determining the average of all the MFreqInit values multiplied by the average 
of all the MFuFac in a system.  The MFreqInit and MFuFac for a single vulnerability are 
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simply calculated by using the using the CVSS values in Table 1 to calculate a 
percentage.  Substituting ARO for MF produces the following equation: 
 
( )∫ ×=
1_N
uFacInit MFMFARO      
 
 A second spreadsheet worksheet, title “Constants”, was created to house constant 
data used in these calculations.  The table of constants appears in Figure 7. 
Access Vector (B_AV) Abbreviation Value
Local (L) L 0.395
Adjacent Network (A) A 0.646
Network (N) N 1.000
Attack Complexity (B_AC)
High (H) H 0.350
Medium (M) M 0.610
Low (L) L 0.710
Authentication Instances (B_Au)
Multiple (M) M 0.450
Single (S) S 0.560
None (N) N 0.704
Confidentiality Impact (B_C)
Complete (C) C
Exploitabiltiy Tools & Techniques (T_E) Value
Unpoven (U) U 0.850
Proof-of-Concept (PoC) POC 0.900
Functional (F) F 0.950
High (H) H 1.000
Remediation Level (T_RL)
Official Fix (OF) OF 0.870
Temporary Fix (TF) TF 0.900
Workaround (W) W 0.950
Unavailable (U) U 1.000
Report Confidence (T_RC)
Unconfirmed (UC) UC 0.900
Uncorroborated (UR) UR 0.950
Confirmed (C) C 1.000
CVSS Temporal Metrics Score
CVSS Base Metric Scores
 
Figure 7:  CVSS Constants 
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With this data, it is possible to perform searches within the spreadsheet program 
to look up the values necessary to calculate MFinit, MFuFac, and MF for each individual 
security vulnerability discovered (based on Houmb’s method).  The resulting spreadsheet 
columns are depicted in Figure 8.  These columns and rows exist in the same worksheet 
as the complete vulnerability data.  At the core, these calculations are simply averages. 
 
Access Vector 
(B_AV)
Attack 
Complexity 
(B_AC)
Authentication 
Instances 
(B_Au)
Confidentiality
(B_C)
Exploitability 
Tools & 
Techniques 
(T_E)
Remediation 
Level (T_RL)
Report 
Confidence 
(T_RC) Initial Frequency
Frequency 
Update 
Factor Frequency
N M N P F OF C 77.13% 94.00% 85.57%
N M N P F OF C 77.13% 94.00% 85.57%
N L N N U OF C 80.47% 90.67% 85.57%
N M N N F OF C 77.13% 94.00% 85.57%
N L N N U OF C 80.47% 90.67% 85.57%
CVSS Temporal Metrics ScoreCVSS Base Metric Scores
 
Figure 8: Frequency Values 
 
4.4 Determining Sources of Financial Impact  
Many firms cannot accurately state how much revenue is lost during periods of 
downtime or how issues affecting one sub-component of a system translate to issues for 
another.  Firms with mature IT organizations, however, will have an outage management 
function that can produce data depicting the cost of system downtime.  Total financial 
impact to a firm might include the sum of areas, such as: 
- Fines/fees resulting from breaking contract service level agreements (SLA) 
- Revenue lost from the inability to sell a product or service 
- Damage to a firm’s brand or reputation 
- Fines from regulatory bodies 
- Lost employee productivity 
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The sources of financial impact will vary from firm to firm, and each category 
must be defined uniquely for the business.  In addition to defining financial impact 
sources, the method in this research utilizes low, medium, and high to arrive at an 
average daily financial loss.  The inclusion of these tiers is completely arbitrary.  The 
tiers simply provide a level of granularity to the business analyst.  The security 
vulnerabilities responsible for low, medium, and high events are not directly tied to the 
financial impact of the event.  In other words, these figures could  represent the financial 
impact resulting from a power failure or a fire – just as easily as the exploitation of a 
vulnerability that leads to the need for complete restoration a system from a known good 
backup.  This concept is important for two reasons: 
1. It is likely any outage management department will have data representing 
financial impacts to systems resulting in general downtime.   
2. As mentioned previously, this approach seeks to produce data that is “just good 
enough” given other data that a firm already possesses.  No effort is made to 
produce actual relationships between the result of exploiting a particularly 
vulnerability and the length at which it causes downtime.  All successful exploits 
are assumed to cause financial impact - be that a denial of service, loss of data, or 
the cost of rebuilding a system.    
4.5 Calculating SLE, ALE, and Cost-benefit 
SLE in this method is derived by determining the start stop times of an expected 
outage.  This duration should be based on previous a practitioner’s knowledge of similar 
outages.  For example, most firms will have knowledge of the length of time that it takes 
to repair a system to a known good state following a catastrophic system failure.  The 
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total expected outage duration is then multiplied by the average cost per minute of an 
outage for that specific system.  The cost per minute is simply an average of all the 
potential sources of financial loss for a particular system (loss of ability to sell 
product/service, regulatory fines, etc).   Finally, if there is risk of data loss, the number of 
records in a system is multiplied by the cost of losing a single record. 
 
)ReRe( cordsNumbercordCostPerCostPerMinMinDurationInSLE ×+×=     
meOutStartTieOutStopTimMinDurationIn −=
*14401 ÷






×= ∑ nLossPerDayCostPerMin
n
  
*
 1440 minutes per day 
To support SLE calculations, the spreadsheet used for this model contains a third 
worksheet tab, titled “Fin_Impact” to hold the financial impact resulting from various 
sources described in section 4.4.  These sources would change depending on a firm’s line 
of business, but for this model have been defined as: 
- SLA by Contract 
- Sales Revenue Lost/Incident   
- Brand/Reputation Damage 
- Regulatory Fines 
- Productivity Lost 
Each of these categories has a low, medium, and high value for financial impact.  The 
inclusion of these levels is strictly for the convenience of the practitioner, and may or 
may not be available in all organizations.  All the values are ultimately averaged and used 
  37 
to calculate the total financial impact of system down time per “system code” per minute.  
A portion of the financial impact table is depicted in Figure 9. 
System Name System Code
Day Hour Minute Low Medium High Average Low Medium High Average
eCommerce ECOM 3,833.33 159.72 2.66 500.00 1,000.00 10,000.00 3,833.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Network NET 20,000.00 833.33 13.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10,000.00 0.00 50,000.00 20,000.00
Security SEC 1,000.00 41.67 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1,000.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average Financial Impact Service Level Agreements by Contract (1 Day) Sales Revenue Lost/Incident (1 Day)
 
Figure 9: Financial Impact Values 
 
4.5.1 Report Dashboard: ALE 
To arrive at the ALE for a “system code”, which can represent one or more 
physical devices or applications, this method uses the widely accepted equation of single 
loss expectancy (SLE) multiplied by the Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO). 
 
AROSLEALE ×=     
The report dashboard produces the ALE for the sum of all vulnerabilities in a 
particular “system code”.  There are two components used to calculate the direct financial 
impact.  First, it is assumed that all successfully exploited vulnerabilities will result in 
system downtime.  Therefore, the model calculates minutes of down time from “Impact 
Start Time” and “Impact Stop Time”.  This data is multiplied by the total “Financial 
Impact/Minute” and the total ARO (average of all vulnerabilities in a “system code”).    
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Next, the CVSS Base sub-score for confidentially (B_C) is used to determine if 
there is a risk for data loss.  Security industry analysts typically rely on an annual report 
published by the Ponemon Institute to determine the cost of losing customer privacy 
information.  The most current report estimates this value at $202 USD (Ponemon 2).  If 
known, the number of privacy records that could be compromised in a system can be 
entered.  The end result is that both system downtime, as well as, data loss is represented 
in ALE. 
 
System 
Code
Impact Start 
Time
Impact Stop 
Time
Impact 
Duration
Financial 
Impact/Minute
Risk of 
Data 
Loss?
Number of 
Records at 
Risk 
Single Loss 
Expectancy 
(SLE)
Annual Rate 
of Occurance 
(ARO)
Annual Loss 
Expectancy 
(ALE)
Cost 
Benefit
ECOM 12/1/09 3:00 12/1/09 7:00 240 $2.66 True 200 $41,038.89 77.10% $31,642.04 $0.73
NET 1/1/10 0:00 1/3/10 0:00 2880 $13.89 True 8,888 $1,835,376.00 78.18% $1,434,870.00 $173.71
SEC 1/1/10 0:00 1/2/10 0:00 1440 $0.69 ------ $1,000.00 75.32% $753.24 $0.15
 
Figure 10: Dashboard 
 
 
4.5.2 Cost-benefit 
The vulnerabilities classes described in section 4.2 are largely mitigated simply by 
applying vendor supplied security patches or by altering some system configuration that 
increases the security posture of a system.  Given that the IT labor for these mitigation 
activities is known by most firms, cost-benefit analysis over a single period is easily 
calculated as: 
gateCostToMitiALEBenefit −=   
Cost-benefit in this model is produced simply by summing the labor estimates 
required to mitigate all the vulnerabilities in a particular “system code” and subtracting 
that value from the ALE.  For the purposes of demonstration, the cost of remediation for 
a single vulnerability is calculated at a labor rate of $70 USD.  It is estimated that the 
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mitigation of each vulnerability requires two hours of labor.  This block of time includes 
not only the time necessary to perform the technical work, but also takes into account the 
time a technical resource would spend completing change management documentation 
and scheduling maintenance windows with stakeholders in the business for a planned 
outage. 
4.6 Abbreviated Example 
The following abbreviated example calculates the ALE and cost-benefit for a 
single vulnerability on a single host utilizing the primary equations described in this 
research.  The vulnerability under review has the properties listed in Table 3. 
Table 3:  Vulnerability Properties 
Vulnerability Name Apache Tomcat Directory Traversal Vulnerability
Common Vulnerability and Exposure ID CVE-2007-0450
CVSS Base Vectors Score
Access Vector (B_AV) Network (N) 1.000
Attack Complexity (B_AC) Low (L) 0.710
Authentication Instances (B_Au) None (N) 0.704
Confidentiality (B_C) Complete (C) N/A
CVSS Temporal Vectors
Exploitability Tools & Techniques (T_E) Functional (F) 0.950
Remediation Level (T_RL) Official Fix (OF) 0.870
Report Confidence (T_RC) Confirmed (C) 1.000
 
 
To determine the frequency for the vulnerability described in Table 3, the 
following calculation is used: 
8723.0
8723.02)94.08047.0(
94.03)00.187.095.0(
8047.03)704.071.000.1(
==
=÷+=
=÷++=
=÷++=
AROMF
MF
MF
MF
uFac
init
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 The CVSS base vector for confidentiality indicates that this vulnerability would 
allow for the complete loss of confidentiality of data.  For this example, let us assume the 
data at risk is customer information that could be used by criminals for identity theft and 
that no other impact to the system occurs. Furthermore, let us assume that there are 
100,000 customer records in the data store and that each record lost causes $202 USD 
impact to the firm.  To determine the SLE, the following calculation is preformed: 
202,00,000000,100202 =×=SLE  
The ALE can be derived as: 
17,620,4608723.0000,200,20 =×=ALE  
If the labor rate for remediation of this vulnerability is $70 USD per hour, and 2 hours of 
labor are required, the cost-benefit is calculated as: 
17,620,320140460,620,17 =−=Benefit  
 In this example, the firm could spend $140 USD to prevent a potential loss of 
$17,620,460 USD. 
4.7 Summary 
This research provides a simple method by which mid-level managers may 
produce the necessary financial calculations to support a business case for the 
remediation of security vulnerabilities.  At the core of the method is a novel use of data 
extracted from CVSS sub-scores to estimate the frequency of security vulnerability 
exploitation.  It is this calibrated estimation of frequency that provides the foundation for 
all other financial calculations.    Ultimately, the total financial impact of the exploitation 
of security vulnerabilities in a collection of “system codes” may be viewed in a simple 
dashboard style report. 
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5. Suggestions for Additional Work 
The model presented in this research is likely more sophisticated than what is 
currently used by most firms for the calculation of security expenditures.  However, the 
simplicity of the approach also presents many opportunities for improvement.  Some 
areas that could be further developed include: 
1. Logic could be introduced into the model to programmatically calculate the 
expected time of system downtime of a single vulnerability.  This calculation 
would rely on expert knowledge internal to the organization. 
2. The potential for collateral damage to systems in adjacent “system codes” could 
be automatically calculated based on “system code” relationships.  In the current 
iteration of the model, “system code” relationships must be known and collateral 
damage must manually estimated by the practitioner. 
3. The calculation for MF in this model is based solely on the weights provided by 
the CVSS sub-scores in Table 1.  A more robust approach might combine these 
weights with actual threat data from intrusion detection or intrusion prevention 
systems.  Thus, the MF value could be increased or decreased in concert with the 
current threat landscape. 
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